Bounds on the Speed and on Regeneration Times for Certain Processes on Regular Trees

We develop a technique that provides a lower bound on the speed of transient random walk in a random environment on regular trees. A refinement of this technique yields upper bounds on the first regeneration level and regeneration time. In particular, a lower and upper bound on the covariance in the annealed invariance principle follows. We emphasize the fact that our methods are general and also apply in the case of once-reinforced random walk. Durrett, Kesten and Limic (2002) prove an upper bound of the form $b/(b+\delta)$ for the speed on the $b$-ary tree, where $\delta$ is the reinforcement parameter. For $\delta>1$ we provide a lower bound of the form $\gamma^2 b/(b+\delta)$, where $\gamma$ is the survival probability of an associated branching process.Comment: 21 page

Bounds on the speed and on regeneration times for certain processes on regular trees

We develop a technique that provides a lower bound on the speed of transient random walk in a random environment on regular trees. A refinement of this technique yields upper bounds on the first regeneration level and regeneration time. In particular, a lower and upper bound on the covariance in the annealed invariance principle follows. We emphasize the fact that our methods are general and also apply in the case of once-reinforced random walk. Durrett, Kesten and Limic [11] prove an upper bound of the form b/(b + d) for the speed on the b-ary tree, where d is the reinforcement parameter. For d > 1 we provide a lower bound of the form g^2b/(b + d), where g is the survival probability of an associated branching process.Random walk in a random environment; once edge-reinforced random walk; lower bound on the speed; regeneration times; regular trees.

Uzbekistan's transformation: strategies and perspectives

The presidential transition in Uzbekistan represents a novel development in the post-Soviet space. Regime insider Shavkat Mirziyoyev has succeeded in initiating change without provoking destabilisation. His reform programme aims to liberalise the economy and society while leaving the politi­cal system largely untouched. Implementation is centrally controlled and managed, in line with the country’s long history of state planning. Uzbeks accept painful adjust­ments in the expectation of a rising standard of living. And the economic reforms are rapidly creating incontrovertible facts on the ground. Uzbekistan has also made significant moves towards political liberalisa­tion, but remains an authoritarian state whose institutional framework and presidential system are not up for discussion. Rather than democrati­sation, the outcome of the transformation is more likely to be "enlightened authoritarianism" backed by an alliance of old and new elites. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for Germany and Europe to support the reforms. Priority should be placed on the areas most relevant for fostering an open society: promoting political competition, encouraging open debate, fostering independent public engagement and enabling genuine participation. (author's abstract

Central Asia's Muslims and the Taliban

Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbours have generally reacted pragmatically to the Taliban's seizure of power there. For the autocratically ruled, secular states on the periphery of the former Soviet empire, economic cooperation and the stabilisation of humanitarian and political conditions in Afghanistan are at the forefront of their interests in maintaining relations with their southern neighbour. According to offi­cial discourse, Central Asia's entrenched secularism is not challenged by the Taliban's Islamism. On social media in Central Asia, however, the Islamic emirate of the Taliban is portrayed as a political counter-model; one which is more positively received in coun­tries with greater discursive freedom and under governments whose policies more openly confront the Taliban. This reveals a trend towards Islamist-inspired iden­tity formation that will be difficult to stop through censorship and repression. (author's abstract

Tajikistan on the road to totalitarianism

Rather overshadowed by ongoing violence in Afghanistan and an unexpected political opening in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan is witnessing the emergence of a totalitarian system focused entirely on the president. Alongside legal moves and key appointments, ideological propaganda plays a central role. Two main trends are involved: the presentation of President Emomali Rahmon as bringer of peace and guarantor of national unity, and the establishment of a canon of "national" norms and values designed to enforce social and ideological homogeneity. The spectre of Islamic fundamentalism is instrumentalised to consolidate the ruling ideology, while surveillance and sanctioning enforce behavioural conformity

Religious policy in Uzbekistan: between liberalisation, state ideology and Islamisation

The religious policy innovations that Uzbekistan's President Mirziyoyev has initiated in the name of liberalisation and reform continue the policies of his predecessor in key aspects. Under the motto "enlightenment against ignorance", state influence over the religious knowledge taught in educational and research institutions has been strengthened. The country's Islamic heritage is proactively used for representative purposes and held up as an integral part of national culture. The religious policy measures that amount to a "secularisation" of Islam through scientification and musealisation do not reach large sections of society. For the ordinary believer, Islam is not a science but a matter of belief, a system of rules and convictions that guides the way they live. The liberalisation of the media landscape means that religious advice is available in abundance. It often includes propaganda transporting illiberal ideas, but the state intervenes only selectively. The liberalisation of religious policy has resulted in a growing Islamisation of the population. The authoritarian state headed by President Mirziyoyev is thus being consolidated. Repression remains the means of choice should Islamic milieus seriously challenge the secular state. (author's abstract

Revolution again in Kyrgyzstan: forward to the past?

Kyrgyzstan's presidential election and constitutional referendum on 10 January 2021 represent the provisional endpoint of a series of violent episodes that has gripped the country since October 2020. The victory of the populist Sadyr Japarov and approval for his plan to reintroduce a presidential system of government prepares the ground for a dismantling of democratic principles and rule of law, so that politically Kyrgyz­stan is set to look more like its Central Asian neighbours. A new constitution is in preparation. The draft bears the portents of a neo-traditional roll-back that rebuffs a young generation demanding more democracy and rule of law, and has the potential to deeply polarise the nation. (author's abstract

Islam in Tajikistan: actors, discourses, conflicts

The revival of Muslim values and ideas in Central Asia is perceived primarily through the lens of security, both among local regimes and by the West. The focus on extreme forms of Islam, however, prevents a balanced assessment of the religious discourse itself and obscures the reasons for the growing attraction of Islam and its potential as a force for order in the post-Soviet states. This study explores the social and political background to the revival of Islamic discourses, networks and practices in Tajikistan since the end of the Soviet Union, identifying the central actors, and laying out the intellectual and social coordinates of the symbolic struggles they are involved in. The growing significance of Islam as a source of moral and practical guidance is associated with a differentiation and pluralisation of the landscape of actors and discourses. The interpretative monopoly of the Hanafite clergy, who cultivate a tradition of tolerance towards culture-specific ritual practice and secular lifeworlds, is now challenged by reformist and universalist doctrines that reject the pragmatic consensus of the religious establishment. The state responds by suppressing the influence of religion through increasingly pervasive surveillance, but this cannot prevent the dissemination of the unwanted teachings. Reversing the tide would demand pro-active investment in good religious education. (Autorenreferat

Elitenwandel und politische Dynamik in Kasachstan

'In den postsowjetischen Staaten Zentralasiens mehren sich die Anzeichen dafür, dass die Resistenz der alten Eliten, die unter dem Deckmantel formaldemokratischer Verfassungen und gestützt durch Transitionsrhetorik durchwegs autoritäre Präsidialregime etabliert haben, für anhaltende innenpolitische Unruhe sorgt. Am deutlichsten macht sich dies in Kasachstan bemerkbar. Seit einiger Zeit drängt hier eine junge politische Elite an die Macht, die bislang von den alten, die Regierung dominierenden Kräften erfolgreich in Schach gehalten wird. Es ist jedoch abzusehen, dass ein neuer Typus von Politikern, Unternehmern und Intellektuellen zunehmend in funktional relevante Positionen vorrücken wird - und dass dabei Weichen gestellt werden für den künftigen politischen Kurs des Landes. Die Studie identifiziert die einschlägigen Akteure und ihre Netzwerke und beleuchtet die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, die über Motive, Handlungsspielräume und -möglichkeiten der Reformkräfte entscheiden. Ihr Einfluss auf die Politik der kasachstanischen Führung ist bislang begrenzt und eine Frage der Machtbalance zwischen einflussreichen Interessengruppen. Gleichzeitig hat sich die kasachstanische Führung vor der eigenen und der internationalen Öffentlichkeit wiederholt für politische Reformen ausgesprochen und sich dabei demokratischen Prinzipien verpflichtet. Ob dies auch in Zukunft überwiegend eine bloße Absichtserklärung bleiben oder ob das Reformprogramm schrittweise in die Tat umgesetzt wird, wird auch davon abhängen, wie die westliche Politik mit den alten und neuen Eliten als den Trägern des Transformationsprozesses umgeht. Insbesondere die deutsche Politik ist aufgefordert, deutlicher als bisher Position zu beziehen. Die Bundesrepublik ist nach den USA und Japan der drittgrößte bilaterale Geber in Zentralasien und genießt dort einen außerordentlich guten Ruf. Dies verpflichtet zu verantwortungsbewusstem und damit anhaltend kritischem Engagement. Dieses sollte sich stärker als bisher auf den Governance-Bereich konzentrieren und Unterstützungsleistungen von Reformen auf diesem Gebiet abhängig machen.' (Autorenreferat

Die Transformation Usbekistans: Strategien und Perspektiven

Der Regierungswechsel in Usbekistan stellt einen Präzedenzfall im post­sowjetischen Raum dar. Präsident Mirziyoyev, ein Regime-Insider, hat einen Kurswechsel initiiert und gleichzeitig eine Destabilisierung ver­mieden. Das von Mirziyoyev vertretene Reformprogramm zielt auf eine Liberalisierung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, lässt das politische System jedoch weitgehend unangetastet. Die Reformen, deren Umsetzung wie früher zentral gesteuert und be­aufsichtigt wird, verlangen den Usbekinnen und Usbeken schmerzhafte Anpassungen ab. Sie werden aber akzeptiert, weil sich damit konkrete Hoffnungen auf eine bessere Zukunft verbinden. Zudem schaffen vor allem die wirtschaftlichen Reformmaßnahmen in einem Tempo Fakten, dass kaum Raum für Alternativen bleibt. Obwohl Usbekistan wichtige Signale auch für eine politische Liberalisierung gesetzt hat, ist es nach wie vor ein autoritärer Staat mit einem Prä­sidialsystem, dessen institutionelle Grundlagen nicht zur Disposition ste­hen. Aus diesem Grund läuft die Transformation perspektivisch weniger auf Demokratisierung zu als vielmehr auf einen "aufgeklärten Autori­tarismus", der von einer Allianz neuer und alter Eliten getragen wird. Dennoch gibt es für Deutschland und Europa gute Gründe, den Reformkurs zu unterstützen. Der Schwerpunkt sollte dabei auf jenen Handlungsfeldern liegen, die für die Entwicklung hin zu einer offenen Gesellschaft von besonderer Relevanz sind: Förderung von politischem Wettbewerb, Ermutigung zu offener Debatte und unabhängigem gesellschaftlichem Engagement und Ermöglichung echter Teilhabe. (Autorenreferat